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Abstract Many social situations require a mental model of the knowledge, beliefs,
goals, and intentions of others: a Theory of Mind (ToM). If a person can reason about
other people’s beliefs about his own beliefs or intentions, he is demonstrating sec-
ond-order ToM reasoning. A standard task to test second-order ToM reasoning is the
second-order false belief task. A different approach to investigating ToM reasoning is
through its application in a strategic game. Another task that is believed to involve the
application of second-order ToM is the comprehension of sentences that the hearer
can only understand by considering the speaker’s alternatives. In this study we tested
40 children between 8 and 10 years old and 27 adult controls on (adaptations of) the
three tasks mentioned above: the false belief task, a strategic game, and a sentence
comprehension task. The results show interesting differences between adults and chil-
dren, between the three tasks, and between this study and previous research.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Theory of Mind
Many everyday reasoning tasks require reasoning about the knowledge and intentions
of other people. The capacity for this kind of reasoning is sometimes called mind
reading. A common approach to studying this capacity uses the phrase ‘theory of
mind’ (ToM), first coined in the article “Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?”
(Premack and Woodruff 1978). In the ToM approach a child’s cognitive development
is understood by assuming that the child acquires a ‘theory of mind’: a mental model
of the social world similar to folk psychology. A child who has a theory of mind under-
stands that other people have minds too, with beliefs, desires, and intentions possibly
distinct from his own. He can formulate hypotheses about what those beliefs, desires,
and intentions are.
While much research has focused on very early development of Theory of Mind,
the focus of the present study is on second-order Theory of Mind, which develops
later than first-order ToM. ToM reasoning can be classified by its order of mental state
attribution. Reasoning about other people’s beliefs and intentions about simple world
facts is first-order reasoning. Examples of first-order attributions are: “Mary believes
that the ball is in the bag” or “You intend to take the left cup”. However, if a person
takes into account the other person’s beliefs and intentions about the minds of others
(including the first person’s), that person uses second-order reasoning. Examples of
second-order mental state attributions are: “Mary believes that John believes that the
ball is in the closet” or “You believe that I believe that the box contains a pencil”. Thus,
the famous false-belief task about Maxi and his mother tests for first-order mental state
attributions: Does the child correctly conclude that Maxi will look for his chocolate
in its original location, while the child knows that Maxi’s mother displaced it while
Maxi was gone, thus attributing a false belief to Maxi (Wimmer and Perner 1983)?
It is the aim of the present article to contribute to charting the late development of
second-order ToM by investigating participants’ performance on tasks in three differ-
ent domains—a strategic game, a grammatical task, and a standard second-order false
belief task. Successful performance on each of these tasks requires the application of
a second-order Theory of Mind.
The article addresses two main issues: the developmental discrepancy of first and
second-order ToM, and the task dependence of ToM. As to the first of these issues, chil-
dren generally pass the standard false belief task by age 4, but it takes another 2 years
for them to pass a similar task if it requires second-order ToM (Tager-Flusberg and
Sullivan 1994; see also Steerneman et al. 2003). A study by Hedden and Zhang (2002)
suggests a cause for this difference, namely that the processing of second-order ToM
is more costly than that of first-order ToM. Hedden and Zhang’s task was a strategic
game, very different from a standard false belief task, and it only included adult par-
ticipants. Whereas participants were generally good at applying first-order reasoning
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when the game so required, second-order ToM reasoning was seriously flawed with
most of the adults. This study suggests inherent difficulty with second-order ToM
reasoning, which may be responsible for the delay in the surfacing of second-order
ToM in child development. If this is the case, we should see that children have less
difficulty in applying first-order rather than second-order ToM, not only in a false
belief task, but also in a game task, and that children perform worse than adults on
such a task. Thus, we made the game task the focus of our investigations.
This brings us to the question of whether we expect differential performance on
tasks involving different cognitive domains. Many studies focus on the question of
whether individuals have a Theory of Mind. The task of experimental research is,
then, to find a way to tap into this mental ability while avoiding its being masked by
performance factors caused by a given experimental task. However, the lower bound-
aries of ToM manifestations have been pushed down to increasingly lower ages, and
the upper boundaries of failed ToM performance may need to be lifted entirely, as
it becomes clear that even adults do not display perfect ToM performance. Thus, the
question of which conditions promote or hamper the use of ToM, and why, has steadily
gained importance (see, for example, DeVilliers 2007, Mol et al. 2005, Verbrugge
and Mol 2008). The present article’s second aim is to contribute findings concerning
second-order ToM to this discussion, explicitly comparing the results from different
experimental tasks. The next section briefly sketches the background of this discussion.
1.2 Task Dependence
Research on ToM development shows that whether participants successfully apply
Theory of Mind strongly depends on the task, a most striking example of which we
find in the discrepancies between the standard first-order false belief task (Wimmer
and Perner 1983) and a recent looking time experiment by Onishi and Baillargeon
(2005). In the standard first-order false belief task, the child is asked to predict the
behaviour of another person, for example where the person will search for an object.
To make a correct prediction the child must understand that this person holds a false
belief that is different from the child’s own, true, beliefs. Success at such a task indi-
cates clearly that the child knows that other people have beliefs, and that the child
can distinguish between its own beliefs and those of others. Children at age 3 still
fail first-order false belief tasks, but children at age 4 or older pass them. In the study
by Onishi and Baillargeon, the dependent variable is looking time. Fifteen-month-old
children were shown to distinguish between cases in which an actor looked in a place
in which the actor knew the object that she looked for was not to be found, and cases
in which the actor looked in the right place. DeVilliers (2007) points out that the vast
discrepancy between 15 months at Onishi and Baillargeon’s task and the passing age
for the first-order false belief task may well lie in the task demands, in that the latter
task, but not the former, requires decision making.
Regarding studies such as Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) that claim to show very
early presence of ToM, questions have been raised as to whether correct performance
on the tasks really requires ToM (see Perner and Ruffman 2005). The limitations
posed by the cognitive and communicative development of young children put severe
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restrictions on the format of experimental tasks. Therefore, to compare the application
of ToM across different tasks, the study of later ToM development may be particularly
suited. The work of Keysar and colleagues provides examples of how adults do not
always correctly draw upon first-order ToM. Keysar et al. (2003) report on experimen-
tal situations in which a speaker uses a term that could in principle refer to two objects
known to the experimental participant, but only to one object for the speaker, as the
latter is unaware of the existence of the second object, and this unawareness is clear to
the experimental participant. The adult participants nevertheless often perform as if the
speaker referred to the object that is hidden from him, thus giving precedence to their
own perspective rather than employing a first-order ToM. An example of imperfect
application of second-order ToM by adults is found in the strategic reasoning game of
Hedden and Zhang (2002), which will be described in some detail in Sect. 4.
The task dependence of successful application of ToM allows several explanations,
all of which have implications for the nature of ToM. A first, and very likely, possibility
is that there is a processing cost associated with ToM, which causes a failure in applying
ToM or the required order of ToM when the processing demands of the task are high.
Another explanation (not incompatible with the first) is that ToM does not necessarily
transfer from one domain of application to another. The ability to understand another’s
beliefs and intentions of a certain order may be present in principle, but to apply ToM
of the appropriate order, an individual must at least recognize that, in a given situation,
it is to his advantage that this knowledge be incorporated in his decisions or actions. In
addition, ToM may not be readily transferable from one domain to another until after
a developmental process has taken place that makes this mental ability accessible to
other domains, for instance Representational Redescription as proposed by Karmiloff-
Smith (1992). Taking this reasoning one step further, it is even possible that what we
call Theory of Mind is not one uniform mental ability to be drawn upon whenever the
situation calls for it, but rather that different applications of ToM constitute different
kinds of mental ability. These are all avenues of thinking about the nature of ToM that
the scientific community may want to explore, however, their exploration is relevant
only if first it is established to which extent there is task-dependence.
It is against this background that we place the investigations presented in this arti-
cle. We compare two groups of participants, 8- to 10-year-old children and adults, on
three measures. The first is a standard second-order false belief task, comparable to
Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994). The second is a strategic game, an adaptation of
Hedden and Zhang (2002), in which participants play against a computer, trying to
maximize their reward. The third measure is a linguistic task, which involves a linguis-
tic phenomenon which is known to be acquired by children quite late, often after the
age of 10. Whereas the connection between second-order ToM and the second-order
false belief task will be clear, the role that second-order ToM plays in strategic games
and language may not be immediately obvious. The next section will be devoted to
the relation between second-order ToM on the one hand, and strategic reasoning and
sentence interpretation on the other.
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2 Theory of Mind in Formal Models of Cognition
2.1 Theory of Mind and Strategic Reasoning in Games
Games in game theory are defined by a set of players, a set of strategies available
to each player, and a specification of the payoffs for each player resulting from each
combination of strategies. There are two common representations for games. In nor-
mal form a game’s players, strategies, and payoffs are represented in a matrix. This
form is especially suitable for two-player games in which each player has only one
move, and in which the players select their move simultaneously and independently.
The strategies (moves) available to one player are represented as matrix rows, while
the other player’s strategies are represented as matrix columns. Each cell of the matrix
lists the payoffs per player, if the game ends in that cell. Games may be characterized
by their matrix size: A 2-by-2 game would be a game where each player chooses
between two possible moves. In extensive form a game is represented as a tree, with
each node representing a possible state of the game. The game starts at the initial node.
Each node ‘belongs’ to a certain player, who chooses between the possible moves at
that node. The game ends when a terminal node has been reached and the players
receive the payoff specified at that terminal node. Extensive form is useful for games
where players make sequential moves. Sequential games are games of perfect infor-
mation: The player has complete knowledge about the actions of the other players
before making his own move.
A certain game outcome (or solution) is a Nash equilibrium if no player can increase
his payoff by choosing a different strategy while the other players keep their strategy
unchanged. All finite games have at least one Nash equilibrium (Nash 1951). Nash
equilibria are easy to identify in normal form representations by looking at each
player’s payoffs: A cell is a Nash equilibrium if the ‘column’ player has no higher
payoff elsewhere in the same column, while the ‘row’ player has no higher payoff
elsewhere in the same row.
A player plays a dominating strategy if the strategy is better than any other strategy
available, regardless of which strategy the opponent chooses. If a dominating strat-
egy exists for a player, this strategy can be found merely by looking at that player’s
own payoffs without regard for the opponent’s. On the other hand, a player plays a
dominated strategy if it is always better for him to play another strategy, regardless of
what his opponent may do. If one player has a dominating strategy then all others are
dominated, but the converse does not hold (see Binmore 1992 or Osborne 2003, for
in-depth discussions of game theory).
Games can be designed so that they require particular orders of ToM for optimal
performance. The use of games for ToM research has a number of advantages. First,
games are different from a false belief story task in that they do not depend on language
skills very much. Games are interesting because they are applied tasks. Using ToM
gives the participant some advantage in the game, but the participant is not explicitly
asked to use ToM, which is relevant because Keysar et al. (2003) showed that per-
formance on an applied task can be far from perfect. Finally, games allow for more
diversity and repetition than story tasks. As a result more items can be administered
and more variation in performance between individuals can be measured.
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Perner (1979) investigated children’s strategies in a 2 × 2 matrix game. Although
the article does not explicitly discuss ToM or order of reasoning, it can be analysed as
a ToM game. The presentation of the game looked like the normal form of the game:
A large wooden board was divided into four cells (2-by-2) with each cell containing
payoffs for each of two players. The child and the opponent (an adult researcher)
secretly and independently picked a row or column. After they revealed their choices
the intersection of the selected row and column determined the payoff for both players.
The game was designed in such a way that a dominating strategy existed for one player
(the ‘column player’). This player could find his optimal strategy without needing to
consider his opponent’s actions, so without ToM reasoning. The ‘row’-player on the
other hand had no dominating strategy, and could only find his optimal strategy by
predicting what ‘column’ would do. The experiment was designed in such a way that
presence of first-order ToM-reasoning could be measured.
All children played both as column and as row, and half of the children were asked
to predict the opponent’s choice before choosing their strategy while the other half
were asked to predict after choosing their strategy. Perner found that children were
more successful at picking their own dominating strategy (if the child was playing
column) than at predicting that their opponent would choose his dominating strategy.
The game required both first-order reasoning (when asking the child what ‘column’
would do) and second-order reasoning (when asking what ‘row’ would do). In the
youngest group of 4- to 6-year-old children only about 50% of all predictions were
correct, which is consistent with chance performance. When the children’s actions
and predictions are crossed there are four possible outcomes. Older children were able
to make correct predictions: When playing as row about 74% of all predictions were
correct. However, when playing as column their performance was close to 50%. Perner
thinks the children were not interested in their opponent’s perspective because it did
not help them: As ‘column’ player they had a dominating strategy that could be found
without the need for prediction. However, when predicting as ‘column’ second-order
reasoning was required rather than first-order. Thus, we propose that difficulties with
second-order reasoning may also have contributed to the lower score.
An experiment designed to distinguish first- and second-order reasoning was devel-
oped by Hedden and Zhang (2002). Hedden and Zhang found that adults start their
game using first-order reasoning and gradually adopt a second-order strategy, but only
when necessary (i.e. if their opponent is using first- order reasoning). The game was
not tested on children. The application of ToM in this game may not be completely
spontaneous, because participants are asked to predict the opponent’s action before
making their own move. Still, the results at the end of the game were far from perfect:
The proportion of second-order predictions at the end of the experiment was 0.7 in
the first experiment and 0.6 in the second experiment. A more in-depth analysis of the
Hedden and Zhang experiment will be given in Sect. 4.
A similar game, the so-called ‘centipede game’, has been studied by McKelvey and
Palfrey (1992). In that game, experimental results with adults did not conform to the
unique Nash equilibrium that could be computed by backward induction or the elimi-
nation of dominated strategies. Only 37 of 662 games ended with the predicted Nash
outcome, in which the first player immediately moves to a dead end, causing the game
to stop after only one step. Although this strategy is non-dominated, it nevertheless
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has a very low pay-off for the winner. In the experiments, both players would often
play more cooperatively, thereby earning larger pay-offs on both sides. McKelvey and
Palfrey do not explicitly use the concept of ToM reasoning in their explanation, but
instead use the concepts of altruistic and egoistic reputations and incomplete infor-
mation: Players may believe that there is some possibility that their opponent has
payoffs different from the ones that the experimenter tries to induce by the design of
the game. Although we acknowledge that concepts like egoism and altruism can be
useful in explaining participants’ behaviour in strategic games, in this paper we will
try to relate strategies directly to orders of ToM.
2.2 Theory of Mind and Bidirectional Optimality Theory
In the domain of language, several phenomena have been argued to require that hearers
reason about the speaker’s alternatives. These phenomena include scalar implicatures,
contrastive stress, object pronouns (Hendriks and Spenader 2005/2006), and indefi-
nite subjects and objects (De Hoop and Krämer 2005/2006). Consider the following
example of scalar implicature from Papafragou and Tantalou (2004):
(1) A: Do you like California wines?
B: I like some of them.
In this example, the term some, which literally means ‘at least one’, conveys the
pragmatic interpretation of ‘at least one but not all’. Although B does not literally say
so, from B’s answer A can conclude that B does not like all California wines. This is
because the terms some and all can be placed on a scale of informativeness, with all
being more informative than some. Because B did not choose the more informative
term all on the scale, A can conclude that apparently B is not in a position to claim
that the stronger form all is the case (for example, because using all would yield a
false proposition). Therefore, the scalar implicature arising from B’s utterance is that
B does not like all California wines.
This pragmatic inference, attributed to Grice’s Maxim of Quantity (Grice 1975),
has been formalized in the framework of bidirectional Optimality Theory (Blutner
2000). According to bidirectional Optimality Theory, speakers do not merely select
the best form for conveying a particular meaning, and hearers do not merely select
the best interpretation for a given form. Rather, speakers also take into account the
hearer’s perspective, and hearers also take into account the speaker’s perspective. Blut-
ner suggests two alternative ways to account for these speaker–hearer dependencies:
by means of a non-recursive mechanism of bidirectional optimization (strong optimal-
ity) or a recursive mechanism of bidirectional optimization (weak optimality). Weak
optimality is defined as follows (adapted from Blutner 2000):
(2) A form-meaning pair 〈f1, m1〉 is bidirectionally optimal iff:
a. there is no other bidirectionally optimal pair 〈f2, m1〉 such that 〈f2, m1〉 is more
harmonic than 〈f1, m1〉.
b. there is no other bidirectionally optimal pair 〈f1, m2〉 such that 〈f1, m2〉 is more
harmonic than 〈f1, m1〉.
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Bidirectionally optimal pairs are pairs for which there is no other bidirectionally
optimal pair with either a better form or a better meaning. Obviously, the pair con-
sisting of the best form and the best meaning is bidirectionally optimal. In addition,
other pairs can be bidirectionally optimal as well if their competitors with either a
better form or a better meaning are blocked by a bidirectionally optimal pair. Only
bidirectionally optimal pairs are realized in language.
This procedure of bidirectional optimization parallels second-order belief attribu-
tion, i.e., it implies second-order ToM. When interpreting a sentence, hearers deter-
mine which meaning m is the best meaning for a given form f1. This merely involves
zeroth-order ToM. In addition, however, hearers must consider whether form f1 and
the selected meaning m1 form a bidirectionally optimal pair, or whether an alterna-
tive form f2 may express meaning m1 better. Since deciding on the optimal form to
express the hypothesized meaning m1 requires that the hearer adopt the perspective of
the speaker, this step requires first-order ToM. The hearer’s belief can be represented
as a first-order belief attribution, for example: “The speaker believes that meaning
m1 can best be expressed by using form f2”. If meaning m1 is identified as part of a
bidirectionally optimal pair 〈f2, m1〉 containing another form than the form that was
encountered, meaning m1 is blocked as a possible meaning for the encountered form
f1. As a consequence, under weak bidirectional optimization the hearer must select a
different meaning m2 for the encountered form f1.1 However, this different meaning
m2 cannot be just any other meaning, but must be the meaning that the hearer knows
the speaker believes the hearer is aware of. This can be represented as the hearer’s sec-
ond-order attribution about the speaker’s belief: “The speaker believes that the hearer
believes that alternative meaning m2 is the best meaning for the encountered form f1 ”.
Thus, interpreting certain linguistic forms requires that hearers consider the alternative
forms a speaker could have used, together with their associated meanings. Because
the hearer must take into account the speaker’s options, which in turn depend on the
speaker’s beliefs about what the hearer is aware of, this type of pragmatic reasoning
can be argued to require second-order ToM.
De Hoop and Krämer (2005/2006) argue that errors in children’s interpretation of
the Dutch sentence in (3) (Termeer 2002) are due to children’s inability to optimize
bidirectionally.
(3) Er ging twee keer een meisje van de glijbaan af.
there went two time a girl of the slide down
“Twice a girl went down the slide.”
In De Hoop and Krämer’s analysis, weak bidirectional optimization as defined in (2)
accounts for adults’ interpretation of the indefinite subject een meisje ‘a girl’. The
canonical word order in Dutch is one in which the subject appears in initial position.
Sentence (3), however, is an existential sentence with the subject appearing sentence-
internally. De Hoop and Krämer (2005/2006) argue that there is a universal linguistic
1 Under non-recursive strong bidirectional optimization, in contrast, the hearer does not have to select a
different meaning for form f1. Either some other meaning is equally optimal for form f1 (i.e., form f1
is in principle ambiguous between meaning m1 and some other meaning m2, such that if m1 is blocked,
m2 remains as a possible meaning for form f2), or else all pairs containing form f1 are blocked. Thus,
first-order ToM seems to be sufficient for applying strong bidirectional optimization.
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constraint stating that indefinite subjects are interpreted referentially. Under a
referential reading of the subject, the noun phrase een meisje ‘a girl’ refers to a par-
ticular girl rather than to any girl. Because the canonical word order (the best, or
unmarked, form) expresses the referential reading (the best, unmarked, meaning), this
referential reading is blocked for the marked word order in (3). As a result of bidi-
rectional optimization, the marked word order in (3) receives a marked interpretation:
a non-referential reading (any girl). To arrive at the correct reading of (3), the hearer
must reason that if the speaker had wanted to express a referential meaning, he would
have used the canonical word order. Upon hearing the marked word order, the hearer
may conclude that apparently it was not the speaker’s intention to express a referential
meaning, and assign a non-referential reading to the subject een meisje ‘a girl’. Thus,
weak bidirectional optimization is crucial for obtaining the adult interpretation of (3).
Because children are not yet capable of optimizing bidirectionally, as De Hoop and
Krämer (2005/2006) argue, children assign a non-adult meaning to sentence (3) and
interpret the indefinite subject een meisje ‘a girl’ referentially. De Hoop and Krämer
support their explanation of children’s errors in comprehension by providing develop-
mental, language-internal and typological evidence. Crucially, because children con-
tinue to make comprehension errors with marked word order even after the age of 10,
whereas they do not exhibit any problems with the comprehension of unmarked word
order nor with the production of unmarked or marked word order, children’s pattern
of acquisition cannot be explained simply on the basis of learned form-meaning pairs.
The choice of linguistic task in our experiment is motivated by the two analy-
ses described above. The task thus builds on the assumptions that weak bidirectional
optimization requires second-order ToM, and that children’s pattern of acquisition of
existential sentences with an indefinite subject, such as (3), arises from the lack of
weak bidirectional optimization.
Summarizing, in this section we discussed two cognitive domains where second-
order ToM appears to be crucial for adult performance: strategic reasoning and lan-
guage. Dekker and Van Rooij (2000) show that bidirectional optimization in language
corresponds to a two-player game in game theory, and bidirectional optimality to
a Nash equilibrium in game theory. Thus we have a nice parallel between strate-
gic reasoning and pragmatic reasoning: Both can be described as a sequential game
between two players, and both require second-order ToM. Since children do not start
out with a full-fledged ToM, the central question of this study is: How does second-
order ToM reasoning develop, and how is it applied to strategic games and sentence
comprehension? We will approach this question by testing how the same group of
children applies second-order ToM in three different tasks: a second-order false belief
task (Sect. 3), a strategic game (Sect. 4), and a sentence comprehension task (Sect.
5). Although these tasks are quite different, there are control conditions for each task
that do not require second-order ToM but that call upon the same cognitive functions
as the conditions requiring second-order ToM. If the children perform adult-like on
the control conditions of each task, we can establish to what degree the dependence
on second-order ToM increases the difficulty of each task. Both the false belief task
and the game task also allow comparison of the participants’ performance on first-
order and second-order ToM. In Sect. 6 we will look at possible correlations between
children’s performance on the three tasks. Section 7, finally, presents our conclusions.
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3 The Second-Order False Belief Test
In this section we discuss children’s and adults’ performance on a standard second-
order false belief task.
3.1 Method and Design
3.1.1 Participants
We tested 40 children from two Dutch primary schools (19 boys, 21 girls; age 8;4–
10;3, mean age 9;2) and 27 adult participants (10 male, 17 female; age 18–26, mean
age 20). The adult participants were psychology students participating for course cred-
its. Each participant took part in three tests in the following order: the strategic game
(discussed in Sect. 4), the sentence comprehension task (discussed in Sect. 5), and the
false belief test (discussed below). The three tests were administered in one session
that took about 30 min.
3.1.2 Materials
For the false belief test, the participants heard two second-order false belief stories,
accompanied by drawings by the hand of the first author. The first story was the
‘Birthday Puppy Story’ reported in Tager-Flusberg and Sullivan (1994), a standard
second-order false belief task. The second story, the ‘Chocolate Bar Story’, was a
second-order adaptation of a first-order story by Hogrefe and Wimmer (1986). After
each story, the participants answered several questions, modelled after Tager-Flusberg
and Sullivan. The questions tested different aspects of the participant’s understanding
of the story, among which the participant’s ability to correctly ascribe a second-order
false belief such as “Mary believes that John believes that the chocolate is in the
drawer”. For the child group, the order of the two stories in the false belief test was
balanced. The adult participants all received the Birthday Puppy Story first.
In the Chocolate Bar Story, John and Mary are in the living room when their mother
returns home with a chocolate bar that she bought. Mother gives the chocolate to John,
who puts it into the drawer. After John has left the room, Mary hides the chocolate in
the toy chest. But John accidentally sees Mary putting the chocolate into the toy chest.
Crucially, Mary does not see John. When John returns to the living room, he wants
to get his chocolate. Questions asked to the participants are: Where is the chocolate
now? (reality control question), Does John know that Mary has hidden the chocolate
in the toy chest? (first-order ignorance question), Does Mary know that John saw her
hide the chocolate? (linguistic control question), Where does Mary think that John
will look for the chocolate? (second-order false belief question), and Why does she
think that? (justification question). See Flobbe (2006) for the complete texts and sets
of drawings for both stories.
If the children are not able to correctly attribute second-order false beliefs but
otherwise are linguistically competent, they are predicted to answer the reality control
question, the first-order ignorance question and the linguistic control question
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Table 1 Correct responses to the second-order false belief question and the justification question for each
story









Children 36 72% (26) 56% (20) 36 92% (33) 83% (30)
Adults 26 100% (26) 100% (26) 27 100% (27) 100% (27)
correctly, but give incorrect responses to the second-order false belief question and
the justification question.
3.2 Results
One adult gave an incorrect answer to the reality control question for the Birthday
Puppy Story. The first-order ignorance question for this story was answered incorrectly
by four children; the reality and linguistic control questions were answered correctly
by all children. For the Chocolate Bar Story, the first-order ignorance question was
answered incorrectly by one child (who also answered this question incorrectly for the
other story), the reality control question was answered incorrectly by one child, and the
linguistic control question was answered incorrectly by two children. All participants
with an incorrect answer to any of these three types of questions (the reality control
question, the first-order ignorance question, and the linguistic control question) were
excluded from further analysis for that story in the second-order false belief task. The
results of the remaining children and adults on both second-order false belief stories
are given in Table 1.
3.3 Discussion
Most children responded correctly to the second-order false belief question. For the
Chocolate Bar Story the correct answer to the question “Where does Mary think that
John will look for the chocolate?” was “In the drawer”. Many of the children also gave
a correct justification for this answer, e.g., “Because Mary doesn’t know that he saw
that she hid the chocolate” (second-order). Children’s performance on the Birthday
Puppy Story is consistent with performance in the same age group found by Perner and
Wimmer in their verbal second-order false belief task (1985). Children’s performance
on the Chocolate Bar Story is somewhat better than their performance on the Birthday
Puppy Story: There was no significant difference between adults and children on the
Chocolate Bar story (χ2 = 2.36, p = 0.12), whereas there was on the Birthday Puppy
story (χ2 = 8.61, p < 0.01). We speculate that perhaps the Birthday Puppy Story is
more difficult for children because it features more dialogue, which is not visible in
the pictures. Hence the Birthday Puppy Story may tax children’s memory more than
the Chocolate Bar Story.
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4 The Strategic Game
In this section we discuss children’s and adults’ performance on an adaptation of
Hedden and Zhang’s (2002) strategic game. Hedden and Zhang studied strategic rea-
soning in adults only, and used a 2-by-2 matrix game with numbers (1, 2, 3 and 4)
as payoffs. Players played against an opponent in a sequential game, where first one
player made a move in the matrix, and then the other player. Players were told to
maximize their own payoff, and to end in a square in the matrix with the highest pos-
sible number. This required them to reason about their opponent’s moves in the game.
Hedden and Zhang’s matrix game is, as far as we know, the only applied task that
has been particularly designed to distinguish first- and second-order ToM. Because
we wanted to use the strategic game to test children on their application of ToM, we
had to both simplify Hedden and Zhang’s game design and make it more appealing.
Also, we made several improvements on their design which allowed us to rule out
inappropriate transfer of simple heuristics from the training phase to the testing phase.
The same participants as in the second-order false belief test participated.
4.1 Method and Design
4.1.1 Game Design
The strategic game was played on a laptop computer with a separate mouse. The par-
ticipant played against a computer opponent.2 The participant was told that he and the
computer opponent were to jointly control a car. The current position in the game was
represented by the location of the car. Decision points in the game were represented
by road junctions. End points of the game were represented by dead ends. Each dead
end contained a reward for the human player (a number of blue marbles) as well as for
the computer opponent (a number of yellow marbles). The reward at a dead end could
be different for each player, and the rewards to be amassed at each dead end differed.
Crucially, all rewards were visible throughout the entire round of the game (car ride).
The reward consisted of 1, 2, 4, or 7 marbles. These numbers were chosen to make the
payoffs easy to distinguish visually and to eliminate the need for counting. At each
junction, the human player and the computer opponent could alternately decide either
to turn to a dead end, where both drivers would receive their rewards, or to continue
on the main road, so that other rewards at subsequent dead ends could be reached.
Each junction was marked with a colour (blue for the human player, yellow for the
computer) to show which player could decide at that junction. The participant was
told to maximize his own reward (i.e., the number of blue marbles), and was told that
the opponent would try to do the same (i.e., maximize the number of yellow marbles).
2 In Hedden and Zhang’s (2002) design, one group of participants knew that they were playing against a
computer, but another group was made to believe that they were playing against another participant. Hedden
and Zhang found no difference in performance between the two groups. We anticipated that the deception
needed in the dyad design would be extremely difficult to organize with children in a school environment,
in part because all the participants are in contact with each other. Since Hedden and Zhang found that it
made no difference, we chose to tell all participants the truth about their opponent.
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Fig. 1 A screenshot of Phase 1 of the computer program which was developed for the strategic game
experiment. The human player (blue) is about to decide on his action. The tube on the left represents the
human player’s score
On the left-hand side of the screen, a tube gradually became filled with marbles as
the human player assembled his rewards. A number, representing the score, was also
displayed. There were two phases to the game. For Phase 1, first-order ToM sufficed
for the participant to maximize his reward. Figure 1 shows a screenshot of the game
in this phase.
The human player is always the first to make a move. At the beginning of each
game, the car moves to the first junction. At this point, the human player is first asked
to predict the opponent’s action by clicking on one of the two yellow arrows placed at
the second (yellow) junction. After this the human player is asked to choose his own
action by clicking on one of the two blue arrows placed at the first (blue) junction.
Depending on the action chosen, the car moves ahead to the next junction or turns
right to the first dead end. If the car moves to the next junction, a text message appears
which indicates which action the computer opponent chooses, and the action is exe-
cuted when the player acknowledges this message. When the car moves to either of the
dead ends, the human player and his computer opponent will receive the reward that
is visible. The human player’s reward is added to his score. A text message indicates
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how many marbles each player received. The message must be acknowledged before
the next game is started. All car movements as well as the collection of a reward are
accompanied by sounds, to increase the attractiveness of the game.
4.1.2 Materials Phase 1
All participants started with Phase 1, consisting of 20 items. The items in this phase
had only two decision points (the first one for the human player and the second one
for the computer opponent, see Fig. 1) and three end points. The payoffs used were 1,
2, and 4, which were distributed over the three end points. The first 4 items of Phase
1 were familiarization items, in which the participant was not asked to make predic-
tions. In the remaining 16 items, the participant had to first predict the opponent’s next
action before making his own move. The items included all 12 different combinations
in which the human player started with a payoff of 2 at the first dead end, and 8 games
in which the human player started with a payoff of 1 or 4 at the first dead end (see
Flobbe 2006, for a complete list of items).
Phase 1 served two purposes: It functioned as a training session, and also allowed
us to determine whether the participants were capable of first-order ToM reasoning.
Consider the situation depicted in Fig. 1. If the participant is capable of first-order
ToM reasoning, he will be able to correctly predict the opponent’s action in the second
move. Assuming that the opponent also tries to maximize his reward, having arrived
at the yellow junction, the opponent will turn right to the second dead end, which
yields 4 yellow marbles, rather than move straight ahead to the third dead end, which
would yield only 2 yellow marbles. A participant capable of applying first-order ToM
in strategic reasoning will be able to use this prediction to rationally determine his
own action. In the situation depicted in Fig. 1, the best action for a human player at the
blue junction would be to turn right to the first dead end (which yields 2 blue marbles)
rather than move straight ahead to the yellow junction. The latter move would yield
only 1 blue marble, given the first-order ToM prediction that the opponent will turn
right at the yellow junction.
A first-order strategy requires players to take into account their opponent’s desires.
It assumes that the opponent acts as a zeroth-order player, who only takes into account
his own desires and the state of the world and simply chooses the largest payoff at that
position. If a human player does not apply first-order ToM reasoning, several zeroth-
order strategies are possible: averaging over the rewards, heading for the maximal
reward, or simply random behaviour. Crucially, for the items in Phase 1, second-order
reasoning is not useful and would lead to the same result as first-order reasoning.
The last 6 items of Phase 1 were treated as test items for our analysis: They allowed
us to determine whether children applied first-order ToM reasoning. We assumed that
all children who participated in the experiment would be capable of first-order ToM on
a standard task. Most children pass the first-order false belief test at age 4 according to
Wimmer and Perner (1983), and the first-order components of the standardized Dutch
ToM-test (Steerneman et al. 2003) have a success rate of over 70% by age 8. Whether
our child participants would also be able to apply first-order reasoning in the game task
was one of the questions this study had set out to answer. Determining whether partici-
pants were capable of applying first-order ToM reasoning in Phase 1 was also essential
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for interpreting the results of Phase 2, which required second-order reasoning. Since
the items in Phase 2 were designed to distinguish first-order reasoning from second-
order reasoning, participants who are not even capable of first-order reasoning should
be excluded from analysis.
4.1.3 Materials Phase 2
Phase 2 consisted of 4 sets of 10 items each. Of these 40 items, 32 were diagnostic
items, which allowed us to distinguish first- and second-order strategies. The remain-
ing 8 items were control items, for which a first- and second-order strategy would
yield the same predictions. The items in this phase had three decision points—the first
one for the human player, the second one for the computer opponent, and the third
one for the human player again (see Fig. 2)—and four end points. The payoffs were
1, 2, 4, and 7. Preceding the 40 items of this session, participants started with 4 items
for familiarization, in which the participant was not asked to predict the move of the
opponent. The test items consisted of combinations in which the human player started
with a payoff of 2 or a payoff of 4 at the first dead end (cf. Hedden and Zhang 2002)
in a random order (see Flobbe 2006, for a complete list of items).
In Phase 2, the computer opponent always used first-order reasoning (in contrast
to Hedden and Zhang’s experiment, where participants played either against a zeroth-
order ‘myopic’ player or a first-order ‘predictive’ player). Consider the situation in
Fig. 2. First, the human player is asked to predict the action of the computer opponent
at the yellow junction. If the human player uses a second-order strategy, he will assume
that the computer opponent acts as a first-order player. This first-order opponent will
assume that the human player acts as a zeroth-order player at the last (blue) junction,
and that he will move straight ahead to the fourth dead end to receive the large reward
of 7 blue marbles. The second-order human player will predict that the first-order
opponent will move straight ahead at the second yellow junction, as the fourth dead
end, which can be reached from the next junction, not only contains the largest reward
for the human player, but also for the computer opponent. The second-order human
player knows that his first-order opponent is aware of his (the human player’s) desire
to gain the largest reward, and that the first-order opponent will count on this desire
in passing the turn to the human player again, rather than turning right to gain a mere
2 yellow marbles. At the first junction, a second-order human player has to compare
the reward at the fourth dead end (7 blue marbles) with the reward at the first dead
end, which he will receive if he decides to turn right (4 blue marbles). A second-order
human player will therefore always decide to move straight ahead at the first junction,
counting on the first-order opponent allowing him to “turn into the street” that has
the largest rewards for both of them. In game-theoretic terms, the second-order player
uses backward induction to eliminate dominated strategies, thereby attaining the Nash
equilibrium, similarly as in the rational solution to the centipede game (cf. McKelvey
and Palfrey 1992).
If, on the other hand, the human player uses a first-order strategy, he will assume
that the computer opponent acts as a zeroth-order player at the second (yellow) junc-
tion. A zeroth-order player will not take into account the opponent’s desires but only
act upon his own desires. As a result, a zeroth-order opponent may decide to turn
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Fig. 2 Another screenshot of the computer program developed for the strategic game experiment. This
screenshot shows Phase 2
right or move straight ahead, depending on the exact heuristic employed. Because the
reward for the human player at the second dead end on the right (2 blue marbles) is
smaller than the reward at the first dead end (4 blue marbles), a human player using a
first-order strategy may therefore decide to turn right at the first junction.
4.2 Results
The last 6 items of Phase 1 were used to determine whether participants were capable
of at least first-order ToM reasoning in this task. If a participant made an incorrect
prediction, this was counted as a prediction error. If the participant made a correct
prediction but nevertheless chose an action that did not maximize his payoff, this was
counted as a rationality error. Figure 3 shows the proportion of errors that were made
during the last 6 training items.
Adults chose the correct action for 97% of the final 6 items of Phase 1, whereas the
children chose the correct action for 71% of the items. Of the 27 adults, only 1 made
more than one mistake. Of the 40 children, 18 made more than one mistake. Nine of
these 18 children made no more than one prediction error.
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Fig. 3 Proportion of prediction errors, rationality errors, and correct actions for the last 6 items of
Phase 1, testing first-order reasoning
All participants who made more than one error in the last 6 items of Phase 1, 1
adult and 18 children, were excluded from the analysis of the results of Phase 2. One
additional child was excluded when we took a closer look at the player’s decision
at the last junction in items from Phase 2. Here, the player does not need to reason
about his opponent’s actions anymore and simply has to choose the highest reward of
the two. However, several children did not choose the highest reward at this point.3
We decided to exclude players who selected an incorrect action at the last junction in
more than 20% of the cases, with a minimum of three incorrect actions. Consequently,
10 children (9 of which were children that were already excluded by the previous
criterion of correct first-order reasoning) were excluded from further analysis. This
leaves us with 26 adults and 21 children in the analysis of Phase 2. Figure 4 shows the
proportion and type of errors that were made in Phase 2.
Phase 2 consisted of 32 diagnostic items, presented in four sets. For each of the
remaining participants, the number of correctly predicted items was calculated and
divided by 32 to obtain the percentage of correctly predicted items. The mean correct
3 Interestingly, further analysis of these cases revealed that in all of these cases the incorrect action chosen
by the child maximized the difference between the payoff for the player and the payoff for the computer
opponent. This suggests that these children tried to collect more marbles than their opponent, hence enter-
taining inappropriate competitive goals. We had considered this possibility after a pilot phase with four
adult participants. To avoid competitive behaviour, we had made a number of changes to the design of the
game: We displayed the participant’s score prominently, while hiding the opponent’s score, and we also
displayed two target scores (the two horizontal lines at the top of the tube in Figs. 1 and 2), which yielded
a real reward (a sticker for children, candy for adults) when reached. Furthermore, we emphasized in our
instructions to the participants that the opponent’s score did not influence their rewards. However, these
revisions may not have been sufficient to completely prevent all children from entertaining inappropriate
competitive goals.
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Fig. 4 Proportion of prediction errors, rationality errors, and correct actions for all items in Phase 2, testing
correct second-order reasoning
prediction for children was 57.2% (score 18.29, SD = 5.68), and for adults 75.5%
(score 24.15, SD = 5.62). The child mean is significantly higher than the mean of 16
that we would expect if all participants were guessing (one sample t-test, t = 1.85,
one-sided p = 0.04). In Fig. 5, the individual prediction scores for each participant
are presented in a histogram.
A cursory look at the data gives the impression that some individuals, especially
in the child group, score around chance level.4 It must be noted, however, that it is
unlikely that participants were guessing, since participants who had not demonstrated
the ability to correctly apply first-order reasoning in Phase 1 were excluded from anal-
ysis. However, Sect. 4.3 explains that there are other possible explanations, besides
guessing, for a score around 50%.
Since the test items were presented in four subsequent sets of 8 items, the predic-
tion score per set could be used to determine whether performance changed during the
experiment. The adults showed a rather small but statistically significant (β = 3.5%,
p = 0.0095) increase in correct prediction rate during the experiment. The chil-
dren showed a small decrease during the experiment, but this was not significant
(β = −3.0%, p = 0.056).
Most of the time participants chose an action that was consistent with their predic-
tion. However, sometimes an incorrect action was chosen despite a correct prediction.
These rationality errors constitute 7.7% of all items for children and 3.1% for adults
4 It is not possible to divide the population into those who score at chance level and those who score
above chance level. The hypothesis that a particular individual score derives from chance can be rejected
for those individuals who have answered 22 or more of the 32 items correctly: p(x ≥ 22) < 0.025 while
p(x ≥ 21) < 0.055, calculated from the binomial distribution B(32; 0.5). This is the case for 5 children
and 18 adults. However, it would be a fallacy to conclude that all other participants score at chance level.
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Fig. 5 Histograms showing the prediction scores for each participant in Phase 2, testing correct sec-
ond-order reasoning. The maximum obtainable prediction score was 32. The black curve represents the
(binomial) distribution of scores that is expected if participants are guessing
(as can be seen in Fig. 4), which is 13.5 and 4.1%, respectively, as a proportion of
correctly predicted items.
4.3 Discussion
From the results of Phase 1 we can conclude that the majority (77%) of the tested
children are capable of making first-order predictions, although these predictions are
not always used to select the correct action. In Phase 2 we found that children perform
above chance with second-order ToM reasoning, with a success rate of 57.2%, but
clearly below the adult group. It should be kept in mind that those participants with
low success rates on first-order ToM were excluded from further analysis based on
their scores on Phase 1. If we compare the scores on first- and second-order ToM
items for only those children who were included in Phase 2, the difference is even
more striking: These child participants had 57.2% correct predictions on second-order
ToM items, compared to 93% correct predictions on the first-order ToM items. Clearly,
children find second-order ToM more difficult than first-order ToM in the game task.
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However, the adult success rate on the second-order ToM items (75.5%) shows that
even adults do not reliably apply second-order ToM reasoning when needed.
In Hedden and Zhang’s experiment (2002), adult prediction scores started at a low
value of around 20% for the first item set, and then rose to about 60–70% towards
the end of the test session. Our experiment yields different results: The adults have a
prediction score around 75% throughout Phase 2, with only a small increase in per-
formance during the experiment. In other words: Our adult participants perform better
than Hedden and Zhang’s participants, and they do not improve much during the exper-
iment. We offer two possible explanations for this difference. The first explanation is
that our experiment uses a different and more concrete presentation. These changes
were made so that the game could be played by children, but they may have helped
adults as well. Since the test items are mathematically equivalent to those of Hedden
and Zhang, the difference should not be important once a participant is thoroughly
familiar with the game. But especially at the start of the game, a better presentation may
improve performance. A second explanation is that the difference in results between
our Phase 2 and Hedden and Zhang’s test session is caused by a difference between
the items of our Phase 1 and Hedden and Zhang’s training items. Hedden and Zhang
use a special class of ‘easy’ items with 4 cells (dead ends in our presentation) in their
training session, for which first- and second-order predictions should give the same
results. We believe that these items may have encouraged participants to use the ‘eas-
ier’ first-order strategy and later try to apply this incorrect strategy to the superficially
very similar testing items. If we are correct, the improvement of Hedden and Zhang’s
results during the test session represents ‘unlearning’ an inappropriate strategy. Our
items in Phase 1 are quite different from Hedden and Zhang’s training items, as they
have only 3 dead ends, which makes them visually distinct from the items in Phase 2.
Participants will immediately notice that the items in Phase 2 are more complicated
than the items in Phase 1, and that the strategy used during Phase 1 cannot be applied
to Phase 2. The present findings call into question Hedden and Zhang’s conclusion
that adults use first-order ToM as a default, only moving to second-order when the
need arises, thus initially crediting their opponents with no more than zeroth-order
ToM.
The prediction scores of our participants in Phase 2 should be interpreted with care
because a first-order player may entertain different assumptions about how a zeroth-
order opponent would act, giving rise to different predictions. Colman (2003) pointed
out that Hedden and Zhang’s characterization of zeroth-order (‘myopic’) behaviour by
the computer opponent is problematic. A zeroth-order player only takes into account
his own payoffs while disregarding his opponent’s payoffs and options. Hedden and
Zhang’s myopic opponent compares his payoffs at the second and third cell to decide
where to move at the second junction. Colman points out that there are various ways in
which a zeroth-order opponent could take into account his payoff at the fourth cell. He
could average the third and fourth cell payoffs, or he could look at the maximum or the
minimum in the third and fourth cells. Although we did not implement a zeroth-order
opponent in our own experiment, the critique voiced by Colman is still relevant. A
goal of Phase 2 was to distinguish second-order reasoning from first-order reasoning.
If we accept different assumptions about how a zeroth-order opponent would act, we
should also expect different responses from participants who use first-order reasoning.
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We examined alternative first-order strategies, based on alternative assumptions about
how a zeroth-order opponent would act, and found that a first-order reasoner could
have answered up to half of all items of Phase 2 correctly (i.e., like a second-order
reasoner). Therefore, we cannot claim that a given prediction score by a participant rep-
resents a specific proportion of first-order and second-order reasoning. We used items
from Hedden and Zhang for which second-order reasoning would lead to a different
response than Hedden and Zhang’s proposed first-order strategy. Since each item can
only have two possible responses, it would not have been possible to accommodate
other first-order strategies in the experiment as well. Therefore, we need to consider
the possibility that the participant may use some strategy that allows him to answer up
to 50% of the items correctly, without using second-order reasoning. Prediction scores
significantly higher than 50%, however, are indicative of second-order reasoning. In
our experiment, both the child and adult group had a mean prediction score signifi-
cantly higher than 50%, which indicates that both groups used second-order reasoning
to at least some degree.
In general, both adults and children perform better in Phase 1 of the game, when
only first-order reasoning is required, than in Phase 2, when second-order reasoning is
required. Adults perform significantly better than children do. These findings are con-
sistent with the idea that second-order reasoning develops at a later age than first-order
reasoning.
5 The Sentence Comprehension Test
In this section we discuss children’s and adults’ performance on a sentence compre-
hension test with indefinite subjects (cf. Termeer 2002; Vrieling 2006).
5.1 Method and Design
5.1.1 Participants
The same participants as in the second-order false belief test and the strategic game
participated. All children were native speakers of Dutch. Two adult participants were
excluded from the sentence comprehension test because they were not native speakers
of Dutch.
5.1.2 Materials
The test materials were taken from Vrieling (2006). Participants heard two stories,
in each of which two different girls perform a certain action. After each story the
participant heard a sentence and had to decide whether this sentence was correct. We
tested the comprehension of two types of sentences:
(4) Een meisje ging twee keer van de glijbaan af. (canonical sentence)
a girl went two time of the slide down
“A particular girl went down the slide twice.”
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(5) Er ging twee keer een meisje van de glijbaan af. (existential sentence)
there went two time a girl of the slide down
“Twice a girl went down the slide.”
Each participant heard one canonical sentence and one existential sentence. The items
were balanced so that half of the participants received an existential sentence first, and
the other half a canonical sentence first.
De Hoop and Krämer (2005/2006) argue that sentence (5) requires the hearer to take
into account the speaker’s perspective and reason about alternative, unheard forms,
such as sentence (4), and their meaning. The reasoning proceeds as follows. Sentence
(4) is the unmarked form, because the subject appears in its canonical position. Further-
more, there is a cross-linguistic tendency for indefinite subjects as in (4) to preferably
be interpreted as expressing a referential reading (‘a particular girl’). Because a ref-
erential reading is the preferred reading for indefinite subjects, a referential reading
should also be the preferred reading for existential sentence (5). However, a hearer can
reason that if the speaker had wanted to express the unmarked referential meaning,
he would have produced the unmarked, canonical sentence form in (4). Consequently,
upon hearing existential sentence (5), the hearer concludes that apparently it is not
the speaker’s intention to express a referential meaning, and assigns a non-referential
reading to the subject in (5).
If young children are incapable of this type of reasoning about the speaker’s
options (as is argued by De Hoop and Krämer (2005/2006), and Hendriks and Spenader
2005/2006), we predict differences between children and adults when comprehending
(5) but not (4). In particular, we predict that children will assign an interpretation to
existential sentence (5) according to which it must be the same girl who went down
the slide (a referential reading). Such erroneous interpretations were indeed found by
Termeer (2002) and Vrieling (2006).
5.2 Results
The results of the sentence comprehension task are given in Fig. 6. The difference
between adults and children for the existential sentences is highly significant (χ2 =
23.78, p < 0.00001).
5.3 Discussion
The adults always assign a non-referential reading to existential sentences such as (5):
Two different girls may have gone down the slide. Most children (24 out of 40), in
contrast, preferred a referential reading for an existential sentence: It must be the same
girl who went down the slide. Canonical sentences such as (4) were interpreted identi-
cally by children and adults. Only 3 out of 25 adults and 6 out of 40 children assigned
a non-referential reading to a canonical sentence. This outcome is as predicted by
De Hoop and Krämer (2005/2006). If their analysis of indefinite subjects is correct,
our results indicate that most 9-year-old child hearers are not yet able to reason about
the speaker’s options with respect to indefinite subjects.
123
Children’s Application of Theory of Mind 439
Fig. 6 Correctness judgements for canonical sentences and existential sentences. For canonical sentences,
the grammatical response is “No”, for existential sentences, the grammatical response is “Yes”
6 General Discussion
In this section we discuss how performance on the three tasks is related. Because of
the rather uniform, high performance on the second-order false belief task, an analysis
of the relationship between performance on the second-order false belief task and on
the strategic game or the sentence comprehension task cannot be statistically signif-
icant. Only three children answered the second-order false belief question about the
chocolate story incorrectly, and only one of these three children was included in the
analysis of Phase 2 of the strategic game. The results are consistent with the assump-
tion that passing a second-order false belief task is a necessary condition for applying
second-order reasoning to the strategic game, but this assumption cannot be proven
because there is insufficient variation in the data. Similarly, passing a second-order
false belief task may be necessary for applying weak bidirectional optimization in the
sentence comprehension task, but because of lack of variation in the results on the
false belief task we cannot draw any conclusions about this assumption either.
To investigate a possible link between the sentence comprehension task and the
strategic game, we divided the children into two groups by their response to the exis-
tential sentence, and compared the average prediction scores on the strategic game for
these groups. The response to the canonical sentence was not informative, because
the proportion of ‘deviant’ responses to this sentence was very low and similar for
adults and children. We did not include the adult data in our analysis. Given that all
adults gave the same response to the existential sentence and adults performed better
on the strategic game than children did, inclusion of adult data in the analysis might
give spurious results. Of the children included in Phase 2 of the strategic game, 8 gave
an adult-like ‘yes’-response to the existential sentence, and 13 gave a non-adult-like
‘no’-response. For the children who were excluded from Phase 2, the proportion of
responses was similar. The children with an adult-like response had a mean prediction
score of 50%, while the non-adult-like group had a mean prediction score of 61%. A
two sample t-test with pooled variance found that the difference between these means
is not significant (t = 1.49, p = 0.15). Despite sufficient variation in the data for
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each task, we did not find a correlation between a child’s response on the sentence
comprehension task and a child’s prediction score on the strategic game.
What can we conclude from the absence of a correlation between the responses
on the sentence comprehension task and the score on the strategic game? Apparently,
applying ToM is not a unitary skill that develops independently of the domain of appli-
cation. Rather, learning to apply second-order reasoning appears to crucially depend
on the domain of application, which can be a strategic game, sentence comprehen-
sion, or some other domain where taking into account other people’s mental states
may be useful. In particular the discrepancy between the results on the standard sec-
ond-order false belief task and the strategic game task raises a host of questions, as
nearly all children passed the second-order false belief task but only just over half
applied second-order ToM in the strategic game. We will mention just one of these
questions: What is it that children need for their performance on the strategic game
task to improve? It could be that mere practice would suffice, if the strategic game
takes up too many processing resources. This however raises the question of why pro-
cessing and judging the situation in the standard second-order false belief task is so
much easier—formally, the tasks are equal, and we might even argue that the strategic
game task should be easier as a real gain is to be obtained from applying second-order
ToM.
This brings us to another possibility: Children may need to learn to recognize the
importance of applying second-order ToM in the situation of the game. However, this
once more leads to the question of what it is about this game situation that makes this
more difficult than in the situations sketched in the second-order false belief task.
One testable hypothesis that addresses both of these possibilities is that the abstrac-
tion involved in the game task is the key factor, i.e. that the child participants, and
possibly also the adults, can apply second-order ToM more easily in situations that
involve actual people. Their representation or physical presence could support the
knowledge that the other has goals and desires, and also has insight into other people’s
goals and desires. This would point to the relevance of the social embedding of Theory
of Mind abilities, and possibly the role of social interaction in its emergence. This,
and other questions that present themselves, we leave for future research.
7 Conclusion
We used an adapted version of Hedden and Zhang’s (2002) strategic game to test
children on their application of ToM. The majority of 8- to 10-year-old children and
all adults were able to make correct first-order predictions at the end of the first
phase of our version of the strategic game. After excluding participants who did not
correctly apply first-order reasoning, the remaining participants demonstrated second-
order reasoning in the second phase of the strategic game. Adults make more correct
second-order predictions (75.5%) than children (57.2%) do. However, in both groups
performance is far from perfect. Our results differ from Hedden and Zhang in that we
did not find a learning effect or strategy change during the game. Participants who used
second-order reasoning did so from the start of the second phase of the game. Adults
perform better on the strategic game than the children. We can think of two reasons
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why this is so, the most likely of which is that applied ToM reasoning continues to
develop after the age of 8–10 years. Another possibility is that IQ or factors related to
IQ play a role—as the adults were university students, we may assume that they have
above average intelligence. This is a possibility which we leave to future research.
In addition to testing children on a strategic game, we also tested children on their
application of ToM on a second-order false belief task and a sentence comprehension
task. Children’s application of second-order ToM was found to be highly dependent on
the task to be carried out and the domain of application. Whereas almost all children
succeeded on a verbal second-order false belief task, children’s success rate in our sec-
ond-order strategic game was only 57.2%. With respect to the sentence comprehension
task, only 40% gave a bidirectionally optimal interpretation of the indefinite subject
of an existential sentence. Despite sufficient variation in the data for the strategic
game and the sentence comprehension task, we found no relation between children’s
performance on the strategic game task and on the linguistic task.
Thus, we have found that second-order ToM is more difficult to apply than first-
order ToM, for children as well as adults, and that this pattern not only holds for
verbal false belief tasks, but also for strategic games. Moreover, we have found that
successful application of second-order ToM depends crucially on the domain in which
it must be applied. This finding shows that, beyond the question of how human beings
come to have a Theory of Mind, there looms another important question: How do we
learn to use it?
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